

THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

VOLUME 01 NUMBER 2, JULY – DECEMBER 2021



Transitional Justice In Southeast Asia: Theory And Practice

Aulia D. Nastiti

The Role Of Oligarchy In Local Elections Funding: A Case Study Of Central Sulawesi

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Book Review: Democracy In Indonesia: From Stagnation To Regression?

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Online ISSN: 2829-2731

This journal is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID.) The contents of this journal are the sole responsibility of Perludem and DRC for ASIA-PACIFIC Regional Support for Election and Political Transition (RESPECT) Program and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

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Transitional Justice In Southeast Asia: Theory And Practice

Aulia D. Nastiti¹

Abstract

The issue of transitional justice has largely evaded theoretical discussion on democratization in the Southeast Asian context despite the importance of coming to terms with the history of abuse and violence of the past authoritarian regimes. This article fills out this lacuna by incorporating regional analysis of the transitional justice process in several Southeast Asian countries to the larger and mainstream theories of transitional justice that are developed from other contexts. Using the case of transitional justice in Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Indonesia, this article finds that the two most predominant accounts in the literature - the “balance of power” and the “justice cascade” theories - are inadequate to explain the conditions of emergence of transitional justice and the kind of justice measures that the state would adopt. In turn, study of empirical cases in these four Southeast Asian countries sheds light on three plausible factors previously overlooked in the literatures: a) the distinctive, locally based, notion of justice; b) the frame and narrative of legitimacy of past violence; and c) the degree of complicity and entrenchment of current ruling elites in the past conflict.

Keywords: transitional justice, democratization, political transition, balance of power, justice cascade, Southeast Asia.

I. Introduction

In the past few decades, the landscape of Southeast Asian politics has been marked by many important transitions following regime change, especially a democratization process and the end of insurgency conflicts. One of the most pressing issues that arises with such changes is the question of how states and societies ought to deal with past violence and abuses committed by the previous authoritarian regime - which is conceptualized as transitional justice. While the issue is an important concern for policymakers and human rights activists, transitional justice has largely escaped the analytical lens of the literatures of political transition and democratization in Southeast Asian contexts. On the other hand, both policy practices and the substantive literatures of transitional justice have reached a global stage, with most focus on cases in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This is because states in these regions have pioneered efforts to hold accountable their *ancien*

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régime for past human rights violations. Although Southeast Asian countries have recently embarked on the transitional justice process, analyses of the region have been less incorporated in the theoretical debates of transitional justice.

I aim to rectify this gap by bridging the theoretical insights of the substantive literatures of transitional justice and the empirical practices in Southeast Asian contexts. The relatively late adoption and modification, or adjustment, of certain transitional justice models in Southeast Asia provide a fertile analytical ground, not only to fill the sorely lacking regional analyses but to “test” whether theoretical expectations developed from the other parts of the world travel well. In turn, a more fine-grained look at the region, I argue, yields two theoretical benefits. First, it gives us insight about the scope of existing explanations: under what conditions the presupposed determinants of transitional justice yield the expected outcomes, and why they “work” in some cases but not others. Second, it helps us to identify measures of justice that have been adopted and/or the alternative pathways – which are overlooked by the preexisting explanations – that lead or impede states to proceed with past injustice.

I pursue this goal in the following steps. First, I provide a brief overview of two prevailing accounts of transitional justice: the “balance of power” thesis and the “justice cascade” thesis. The former emphasizes the mode of transition and the power relation between outgoing and incoming rulers as the main factors that determine whether states would punish or forgive past dictators. The latter account stresses the importance of global diffusion of human rights norms and the role of civil society activism as the norms entrepreneurs to explain the wide adoption and the states’ commitment to confront the transitional justice issues.

Second, I review some studies of transitional justice in Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Indonesia, to grasp the extent to which the predominant explanations hold. These four countries offer considerable and representative cases of transitional justice in the Southeast Asian region. The justice pursuit processes following notable political transitions in these countries are among the most studied cases and best-known in the literature.² Yet, even in these most typical cases, I found that the “balance of power” thesis is at worst wrong and at best insufficient to explain the outcome of transitional justice implemented in each country under scrutiny. The “justice cascade” thesis, on the other hand, explains the emergence of pressure to the state to adopt some measures of justice. But, the demand-side account is not sufficient to explain under what conditions states decide to proceed with justice and which kind of measures they would adopt.

Third, reflecting on the preexisting studies that discuss empirical cases in Southeast Asia, I found that the pattern of transitional justice outcomes in the region may plausibly

2 Renée Jeffery and Hun Joon Kim, eds., *Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Lia Kent, Joanne Wallis, and Claire Cronin, *Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Asia and the Pacific* (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2019).

depend on three alternative factors: a) the distinctive, locally-based, notion of justice; b) the frame and narrative of legitimacy of past violence; and c) the degree of complicity and entrenchment of current ruling elites in the past conflict. Exploring these three alternatives, I argue that the elite's complicity and the legitimacy of past violence may be two underlying factors that shape political elites' decisions, by way of providing incentives structures for elites to strategically construct the distinctive notion of justice that they pursue. The last section concludes the paper.

II. Determinants of Transitional Justice: Two Main Approaches

While the process of transitional justice dates at least back to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials in the aftermath of World War II, the scholarship of transitional justice has been more developed following the "Third Wave" of democratization.³ Huntington (1991: 211) says that the new rulers face the dilemma of facing "the torturer problem" and they have options either to "prosecute and punish, or forgive and forget."⁴ Yet, the records show that not only does transitional justice emerge and spread - albeit unevenly - but also the justice options exist beyond just the dichotomous option of prosecution and amnesty, including a third way of truth commission and revision of domestic law.

This theoretical puzzle pushes students of democratization⁵ and students of conflicts⁶ to explain the emergence and the decision-making behind the various measures of transitional justice. The global diffusion and "normalization" of transitional justice ideas and practices⁷ attract the attention of international relations (IR) scholars as well,⁸ especially related to the rise and effect of international contexts in shaping the transitional justice process in domestic politics. Their inquiries have largely resulted in two dominant accounts of transitional justice, which I elaborate in the following discussion.

A. The Power Balance Thesis

This thesis is pioneered by Huntington (1991), who argues that the decision whether to punish or pardon largely depends on the interests of the political elites. The underlying assumption is that the struggle of interests and the capacity between outgoing

3 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

4 Samuel P. Huntington, "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 4 (1991): 579-616.

5 Luc Huyse, "Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Make in Dealing with the Past," *Law and Social Inquiry* 20, no. 01 (1995): 51-78. Monika Nalepa, *Skeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

6 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice," *International Security* 28, no. 3 (2014): 5-44.

7 Ruti Teitel, *Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

8 Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics* (London: WW Norton & Company, 2011); Hun Joon Kim, "Structural Determinants of Human Rights Prosecutions After Democratic Transition," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012): 305-20.

authoritarians or incoming democratizers overpower the interests and demands of citizens and organized civil society groups. In this sense, the most important cause of transitional justice for him is the balance of power between old and new elites that accompanies the political transition moment.

The theory further posits that the variety of transitional justice measures depends on the mode of transition that a state takes. Huntington identifies three modes of transition: a) transformation, where the decision to reform comes from the old regime's elites who have upper hand contra the opposition and want to keep their power by changing the political climates; b) transplacement, where old authoritarian elites have declining power in facing the challengers, but they were able to negotiate the exit terms; and c) replacement, where the old regime was completely overthrown and replaced due to the lost power. Huntington claims that "in transformations former officials of the authoritarian regime were almost never punished; in replacements they almost always were. In transplacements this was often an issue to be negotiated." (1991: 615).⁹ The theory then generates testable empirical hypotheses regarding the varieties of justice measures: trial is most likely to occur in the replacement transition, the truth commission - as a negotiated way - is expected in transplacement, and amnesty or total impunity is most probably seen in transformation.

Several empirical findings from Eastern Europe and Latin America support the theory and have largely converged in emphasizing three points.¹⁰ First, the decision to have transitional justice, and which strategy chosen, comes largely from the political calculation of new elites. Therefore, the key mechanism in producing the outcome is the elites' political incentives, determined by who are the incoming rulers and how they attain power in the new regime. Second, timing matters. Given the narrow window of democratization (or post-conflict transition), incentives to hold accountable the old regimes come in the immediate period of transition. The theory also considers that public demands for prosecutions are relatively short-lived and tend to wane in the long run. Third, the incoming elites are often hesitant to proceed with justice for fear of instability in their rule. These propositions serve as observable implications of the theory.

B. The Justice Cascade Thesis

This theory constitutes a direct challenge to the power balance theory in its underlying assumptions and the proposed causal factors. It starts with an observation that among countries with diverse democratization manners, the national policies on transitional justice have reflected a convergence that corresponds to the spread

9 Huntington, "How Countries Democratize."

10 Huyse, "Justice After Transition"; Elin Skaar, "Truth Commissions, Trials-or Nothing? Policy Options in Democratic Transitions," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 6 (1999): 1109-28.

of international normative trends toward the protection of human rights. Sikkink (2011) calls the trend “justice cascade”¹¹ and Sriram (2005) observes as “a revolution in accountability.”¹² Sikkink further conceptualizes justice cascade as “a rapid and dramatic shift in the legitimacy of the norms of individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an increase in actions (such as trials) on behalf of those norms.”

The theory suggests that international norms diffusion is an important drive for policymakers to adopt transitional justice measures. But, Lutz & Sikkink (2001) argued that the justice cascade was not spontaneous, nor was it the result of the natural evolution of law or global culture. Rather, justice cascade entails changes in ideas and practices driven and fueled by human rights activists that spread globally in a modularity. According to them, “the justice cascade started as a result of the concerted efforts of small groups of public interest lawyers, jurists, and activists who pioneered strategies, developed legal arguments, recruited plaintiffs and witnesses, marshaled evidence, and persevered through years of legal challenges” (Sikkink and Kim 2013: 277).¹³ In Sikkink’s words, these activists are the “norm entrepreneurs” whose emergence was facilitated by two broader structural changes in the world, the third wave of democracy and the end of the Cold War. Therefore, this theory decidedly stresses the demand-side explanation, in making sense of elites’ political decisions. Empirical support for the theory comes, for instance, from Kim’s statistical test of 71 countries which shows that active advocacy for individual criminal accountability is a key factor guaranteeing persistent and frequent human rights prosecutions.¹⁴

III. Empirical Realities in Southeast Asia: Congruency and Discrepancy with Theories

The previous literatures and the widespread practices of political accountability have established several key measures of transitional justice, ranging from trials, truth commission, lustration, remuneration for victims, and restoring the official historical narratives. In general, we can identify three constitutive dimensions of transitional justice: truth revelation (truth), offender responsibility (punishment), and victim reparation (reparation). While these constitutive dimensions have appeared in many empirical cases, not all states adopt them equally. This is especially true for the cases in Southeast Asia. Most countries usually adopt only a truth commission or even give pardon (amnesty) in addressing their past crimes, such as in the Philippines and Indonesia. Few countries pursue all three mea-

11 Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade*.

12 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,” *American University International Law Review* 19 (2003): 301-430.

13 Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, “The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 9 (2013): 269-85.

14 Kim, “Structural Determinants of Human Rights Prosecutions After Democratic Transition.”

asures of transitional justice, but among them are Cambodia and East Timor – in which transitional justice is adopted to address the termination of conflict, rather than democratization.

Previous empirical studies of transitional justice in these countries mostly focus on one specific mechanism (i.e., trial or truth commission, or amnesty) and are limited by within-country analysis rather than looking at comparative perspectives. Given that, we have little sense of why and when some countries undergoing transition in Southeast Asia adopt full measures of justice, while others adopt them only partially, or even resort to amnesty or impunity.

Toward answering this question, I provide a brief discussion of the experience of transitional justice in four countries – Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Indonesia – with a comparative lens in mind. The selection of these four countries follows the strategy of “typical case” selection which, according to Seawright and Gerring (2008), focuses on “a case that exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship.” All four countries analyzed in this paper are appropriate for “typical” or “representative” cases for they similarly display a relationship between the outcome of transitional justice and the plausible explanation proposed by the two main theories: power balance of regime transition and international pressure of justice cascade. In all four of these cases, one observes the formation of an international committee of justice as well as specific power competition following the political transition leading to some justice measures.

Yet, despite the similarity of general outcomes and the hypothesized causes, these four countries display interesting differences in types and timing of the transitional justice. In this sense, the cases of Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Indonesia are appropriate to test whether the most established theories still hold to explain the different outcomes within these seemingly similar cases. In particular, I aim to use these cases as an empirical lens to “test” the explanatory power and analytical leverage of the two main theories. Even though I do not claim to offer a causal theory, I argue that my empirical discussion also offers grounds to identify the alternative causal pathways that have been overlooked in the existing body of literature.

A. Cambodia: Trial, Truth, Reparation

Cambodia is perhaps the landmark case of transitional justice in contemporary Southeast Asia and one of the most studied cases in the literature. The transitional justice process in Cambodia has been adopted, in particular, to address the mass killing and crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979. Pol Pot’s rule was ended by a military defeat by Vietnamese troops in 1979, after which a Vietnamese backed domestic government was established. But the Khmer Rouge leadership did not fully surrender until 1999. In 1979, the country held the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal in which Pol Pot and his deputies were found guilty in absentia of genocide and sentenced to death. Yet, the tribunal result did not hold much legitimacy due to

the politicized Cold War frame that saw the tribunal as a Vietnamese intervention.¹⁵

Liberation from the Khmer Rouge regime did not instantly bring Cambodia to stable rule, even despite the formation of the State of Cambodia in 1989. Instead, the country “survived a decade of foreign occupation, international isolation, and guerrilla terror and harassment” (Kiernan, 2002: 483).¹⁶ In 1991, the United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia which resulted in the 1993 internationally supervised election that saw the formation of a somewhat democratic government and the withdrawal of the UN mission. The international community was actively involved in pressing the Cambodian government to implement transitional justice measures.¹⁷ In 1994, the government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) granted amnesty to members but not leaders of the Khmer Rouge. Only in 1997 did the Co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia formally write a request to the UN to set up a special tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders, which eventually took place starting in 2003.

The primary measure of transitional justice in Cambodia entailed the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to hold accountable those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia. The ECCC is a genuinely hybrid court – the first of its kind. In what sense it is hybrid? The courts were co-designed by international and local actors, were funded from a combination of international funds and Cambodian government budget and mandated a balance of judges appointed by international and national courts. The procedures of the courts also follow the Cambodian legal system combined with some aspects of international law.

Observers generally see transitional justice in Cambodia as a relatively successful process. Ainley (2013), for instance, notes that while the Courts could not legally punish Pol Pot before his natural death in 1998, the trials in the ECCC have sentenced most responsible people of significant rank. It showed that the court functions beyond just a formality. Ainley also observes that the trial has led to public interest in justice and wide support for the ECCC.¹⁸ Theiring (2017: 186) notes that the Courts have also made headway that drives “a variety of facets reconciling individual victims in Cambodia. Through victim support, production of a legal culture rooted in international law, and establishment of a common history, the ECCC has given people

15 Kirsten Ainley, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: The Coincidence of Principle and Power,” in *Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Renée Jeffery and Hun Joon Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 125–56.

16 Ben Kiernan, “Introduction: Conflict in Cambodia, 1945–2002,” *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (2002): 483–95.

17 Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Jamie Rowen, “Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 31 (2009): 163–220.

18 Ainley, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia.”

a means to begin to recognize and transition from the days of the Khmer Rouge.”¹⁹ It is too early to know if it has or will deter future violence, but it has, it seems, enabled the violence of the past to be discussed more openly: the KR period is now (for the first time) a compulsory aspect of school curriculums.

What lessons does the Cambodian experience provide to assess the theoretical explanation of transitional justice? Cambodia seems to defy the expectations of power balance theory, especially regarding the timing and the expected outcome of justice measures. While the downfall of the Khmer Rouge regime largely followed the replacement path, as the regime was completely overturned and replaced by the Vietnamese backed government in 1979, the Khmer Rouge was not punished, as the theory would expect, and other measures of transitional justice were absent until 1997. Therefore, contrary to the theoretical postulation that demand and incentives to proceed with justice are short-lived and most likely in the transition process, the Cambodian case shows that the process was instead delayed. The outcomes of the justice process in Cambodia were largely produced by the pressures from activism from international institutions. In this sense, the “justice cascade” thesis is correct in identifying the significance of norm diffusion and the role of international factors, but the theory gets the primary actor wrong because the role of civil society is minimal, and the popular demand/support came only after the Courts took place.

Another insight is that the Cambodian case does not seem to confirm the expectation that “prosecutions may deter human rights violations by increasing the perception of the possibility of costs of repression for individual state officials”²⁰ and that “transitional justice overall has a positive effect on the change in human rights and democracy measures”²¹ (Olsen et al. 2010). Instead, Kheang Un (2011: 547) finds that “since 2003, Cambodia has evolved into hegemonic party authoritarianism wherein the minimum criteria for democracy - freedom of expression, freedom of assembly - have been seriously curtailed while periodic elections have been maintained.”²² In addition, Ainley (2013) finds that “with respect to human rights measures, based on PHYSINT data which uses a range of zero to indicate no government respect for physical integrity and eight to indicate full respect, Cambodia shows a significant decline from a score of five in 2002 to two in 2007.”²³

19 Robert Theiring, “The Policy of Truth: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Between the Rwandan Gacaca Court and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” *California Western International Law Journal* 48 (2017): 159-88.

20 Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade*.

21 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 32 (2010): 980-1007.

22 Kheang Un, “Cambodia: Moving Away from Democracy?,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 5 (2011): 546-62.

23 Ainley, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia,” p. 154.

B. East Timor: More Reconciliation and Reparation, Less Prosecution

The process of transitional justice in East Timor must be placed in a context similar to the post-colonial states against their former colonizers. This is because the massive human rights abuse in East Timor occurred under unlawful occupation from 1976 to 1999 by the Indonesian government - under Suharto's dictatorship. After decades of guerilla resistance, combined with intensive international diplomacy by East Timorese national leaders, the external, imposed rule ended in 1999 in a national referendum in which more than 80 percent of East Timorese chose to separate from Indonesia. In the years leading to the eventual collapse of Suharto's rule in 1998, the Indonesian state had faced strong pressure from the international community regarding the illegitimate rule that Indonesia imposed on the nation - in particular after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre.

The transition to independence in East Timor, from 1999-2002, was coordinated by a multinational intervention, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UN-TAET). The international transitional administration established a Serious Crimes Unit and - similar to the UN's approach in Cambodia-a 'hybrid,' or internationalized, tribunal, known as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes.²⁴ The tribunals were mandated to investigate and prosecute cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, torture and sexual offences. On the other hand, the Indonesian government eventually created its own mechanism, an ad hoc human rights court in Jakarta, to meet the pressure from the international community-and also as part of the process of Indonesia's own democratic transition-to try within its jurisdiction the human right abusers who played a leading role in the post-referendum violence. Studies of transitional justice in East Timor have noted the shortcomings of these judicial attempts.²⁵ They generally observe that the established judicial measures have failed to hold the serious crimes perpetrators accountable. After a decade, not one Indonesian official, let alone any of the high-ranked generals, has been successfully prosecuted for any 1999-related crime.

While the judicial measure is largely a failure, studies have found that the process of transitional justice has, both domestically in East Timor and bilaterally between

24 Ida Maria Solaas, "Transitional Justice in East Timor: A Case Study of Justice Versus Reconciliation and Its Consequences" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2009); Lia Kent, "Local Memory Practices in East Timor: Disrupting Transitional Justice Narratives," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5, no. 3 (2011): 434-55; Lia Kent, "Interrogating the 'Gap' Between Law and Justice: East Timor's Serious Crimes Process," *Human Rights Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (2012): 1021-44. \\uc0\\u8221{} {\\i{}International Journal of Transitional Justice} 5, no. 3 (2011)

25 Joseph Nevins, *A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor* (Cornell University Press, 2005); David J. Cohen and Paul Seils, *Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta* (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2003); Suzanne Katzenstein, "Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 16 (2003): 245-78; Paulo Gorjão, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 2 (2002): 313-36.

East Timor and Indonesia, been characterized by an emphasis on reconciliation.²⁶ The UN-initiated Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) undertook a nationwide truth-seeking process and organized community reconciliation hearings to reintegrate perpetrators of less serious crimes, including looting and arson, into their communities. After East Timor gained independence, its government, together with the Indonesian government, established yet another mechanism, the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF). This Commission was mandated to seek the “conclusive truth” about the 1999 violence with a view to fostering friendship and reconciliation between the two nations. While the CAVR was a mix of reconciliation founded on research-based truth and on political negotiation, the CTF involved reconciliation based more on political negotiation and a politically negotiated truth.

Why has the process of transitional justice become more reconciliatory than judicially focused? Kent (2013) notes that members of East Timor’s political elite have used transitional justice discourse selectively to support their own specific agendas. Conscious of the new nation’s geopolitical constraints, East Timorese leaders have promoted an agenda of reconciliation as “forgiveness and forgetting.” This narrative can be seen in the establishment of the bilateral CTF, which embodied the leadership’s outright rejection of a prosecutorial approach and the promotion of a nation-building agenda that stressed moving on from the past and building diplomatic relations with Indonesia.²⁷ At the society level, Kent (2012) also identifies the discrepancy between the universalized, official, conception of “justice” adopted and imposed by the international model and the locally-based understanding of the justice that informs the preference of the population regarding what kind of strategies they use.²⁸ This is in line with studies in Sierra Leone (Kelsall 2009), for instance, that have shown that local communities may understand ‘justice’ very differently from the way in which it is defined by official institutions.²⁹ Other studies examine the everyday localized acts of survival through which individuals and communities seek to reconstruct their lives and rebuild relationships in the wake of protracted conflict.³⁰

Overall, we see that while the transition processes in both Cambodia and East Timor have in principle taken the form of replacement, the transitional justice yielded diverging outcomes. In East Timor, although the tribunals were in place, they did

26 Lia Kent, *The Dynamics of Transitional Justice: International Models and Local Realities in East Timor* (London: Routledge, 2018).

27 Lia Kent, “Beyond ‘Pragmatism’ versus ‘Principle’: Ongoing Justice Debates in East Timor,” in *Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Renée Jeffery and Hun Joon Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 157–94.

28 Kent, “Interrogating the” Gap” Between Law and Justice.”

29 Tim Kelsall, *Culture Under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

30 Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, *Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Kris Brown, ““What It Was Like to Live Through a Day”: Transitional Justice and The Memory of the Everyday in a Divided Society,” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6, no. 3 (2012): 444–66.

not function. Instead, the justice measures were largely reconciliatory. In terms of timing, the power balance theory provides accurate insight in the East Timorese case that the incentives for the justice process emerge mainly in the immediate aftermath of the transition. But this is because of the strong international pressure and transnational activism that invoked the violation of normative international principles of state sovereignty, which set in motion mounting pressure on the Indonesian government - which also faced its own democratization phase. In this sense, the “justice cascade” thesis has been more helpful in making sense of the emergence of popular demand for justice in East Timor.

C. Philippines: Performative Process and Elusive Promises of Justice

There are at least two transitional justice processes in the country: the one concerning Philippine society post-Marcos dictatorship, and the other involving the insurgency conflict within the Bangsa Moro in the Southern Philippines. The former is incomplete, and the latter is yet to be proven as an ongoing commitment. But, in general the government’s commitment with the latter process seems stronger than with the former. Maglana (2016), for instance, argues that “the signs are encouraging that the new administration will act on the recommendations of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report.”³¹ The committee was created under the Normalization Annex of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB).

In regard to Marcos’ human rights abuses, however, justice is largely a stalled process. After the 1986 EDSA People Power demonstration that helped seal the fate of Marcos’ dictatorship and forced him to seek exile in Hawaii, the Philippines was ruled under the elected president Cory Aquino, who took some transitional measures to reinstate democracy in the country. While some consider her government as a redeemer, a number of scholars and political analysts also see the transitional government as “restorationist” of “*cacique* democracy”³² where the old oligarchs and patrimonial elites were brought back to power, and those who embezzled the country’s wealth and committed human rights violations were never prosecuted.

In his study on truth commissions, Christie (2000) revealed that the Philippines was one of the few countries that did not successfully complete the report, despite the government’s initiative to transition to a democratic regime.³³ The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was created in 1988 to investigate the past violations but its power was limited to making recommendations for prosecution and not to prose-

31 Mags Z. Maglana, “Marcos Burial, Transitional Justice, and Peace Process,” *SunStar Philippines*, August 19, 2016, <https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/93110>.

32 Benedict Anderson, “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines,” *New Left Review*, no. 169 (1998): 3-33.

33 Kenneth Christie, *The South African Truth Commission* (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 2000).

cute any party.³⁴ Another agency, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), was established to investigate and recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and its cronies. Until 2016, the PCGG had not fully completed its task, and as of 2015 there were still civil cases filed against 19 parties to recover illegal assets worth 32 billion pesos.³⁵ There have been efforts to provide reparations to victims of Martial Law under the 2013 Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act, and there are also plans to set up a memorial museum on the Martial Law era that would include artifacts, memorabilia and other items. But the recent near victory of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in his running for the vice-presidency, and the strong resolve of President Duterte to bury Marcos Sr. at the cemetery of national heroes indicate a lack of shared apprehension of the Marcos years.³⁶

Plantilla (1997) argues that the process of post-Marcos transitional justice has been full of “elusive promises” and “performative promises.”³⁷ Soon after taking office, Aquino initiated the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover properties illegally acquired by Marcos and his associates, as well as open up a legal case against the murder of Benigno Aquino, which resulted in the conviction of 16 out of 36 rank-and-files soldiers implicated in the assassination. However, the trial failed to reach a conclusive answer of who was the mastermind of the killing and who made the order. Nor was the government able to bring back and confiscate Marcos’ wealth to pay back the stolen and plundered state’s resources and pay the victims compensation.

While zealously promoting human rights and pursuing the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, as Plantilla (1997) observes, the Aquino administration failed to confront four primary institutional obstacles to justice: the army, the police, the judiciary, and the civilian bureaucracy. Much of the extra-judicial killings—known as “salvaging” in the Philippines—are attributed to the police, who believed that death was a better form of justice than allowing a suspect, who may or may not be politically involved, to remain free. Salvaging and other abuses were never curbed by the Marcos administration, and such logic remains intact even until today under Duterte’s administration. This “subculture of tyranny and oppression” in the security apparatus was the main cause of hundreds of cases of torture, disappearances, and other human rights violations that remain unaccounted for.

In his article, Huntington (1991) characterized the Philippines’ democratic transi-

34 Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Remembering the Legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship: The Formation of Historical Memory and the Struggle for Justice in the Post-Marcos Period,” in *The Work of the 2011/2012 API Fellows* (Bangkok, Thailand: API Regional Coordinating Institute, Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, 2014), 1-8.

35 Philip M. Lustre, “Search for Marcos’ Wealth: Compromising with Cronies,” *Rappler*, February 25, 2016, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/123667-marcos-cronies-compromise/>.

36 Maglana, “Marcos Burial, Transitional Justice, and Peace Process.”

37 Jefferson Plantilla, “Elusive Promise: Transitional Justice in the Philippines,” *Human Rights Dialogue*, Transitional Justice in East Asia and its Impact on Human Rights, 1, no. 8 (March 5, 1997).

tion as a case of replacement, but even if we grant this interpretation, the transitional justice outcome that evolved was in a stark contrast to what Huntington would expect.³⁸ Instead of being prosecuted, Marcos and his cronies not only managed to live freely but also remained wielding much influence in the country's politics. The Philippine case also demonstrates the limits of the justice cascade argument. Civil society activism was vibrant in pushing for accountability toward transitional justice. Yet, even then, the demand did not necessarily translate into the adoption of reconciliatory, let alone judicial, measures.

D. Indonesia: Selective and Localized Justice, Impunity at Large

Democratization in Indonesia followed a similar pattern to that which took place in the Philippines. The strong dictator seemed to be brought down by massive and intense popular resistance. But a deeper look at the transition in Indonesia actually reveals that the decisive force that set in motion Suharto's collapse started with the crack inside his own oligarchic circle and that, even at the last moment, Suharto managed to secure a deal with the powerful armed forces leader to let him leave the scene calmly and to guarantee that he and his family would be out of reach of any legal measures.³⁹ So in this sense, Indonesia's transition perhaps fits better with the transplacement path.

Post-authoritarian Indonesia has faced many cases of past human rights abuses: the 1965-66 anticommunist massacres, 1984 Tanjung Priok killings, the 1998 shootings of protestors, internal armed conflict in Aceh, Papua, and the occupation of now-independent East Timor. But these various cases show different outcomes of transitional justice. In the East Timor case, as I discussed earlier, the Indonesian state adopted two comprehensive mechanisms: 1) a domestic ad-hoc human rights court system against an international court for East Timor, and 2) a truth and reconciliation commission-truth-seeking combined with amnesty-against domestic ad-hoc human rights courts. In this process, Suh (2012) argues that the most important driving force was transnational human rights activism.⁴⁰

A different outcome occurred in the transition following the Aceh conflict in 2005, which ended through a series of peace agreements. The peace agreement established four mechanisms to implement peace between the two sides: 1) amnesty for the rebel fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM); 2) demobilization, disarmament, and decommissioning of GAM and the Indonesian forces; 3) a reintegration agenda for combatants, political prisoners, and civilians of the conflict, and 4) the establishment

38 Huntington, "How Countries Democratize."

39 Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London: Routledge, 2004).

40 Suh Jiwon, "The Politics of Transitional Justice in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2012).

of a human rights court and a truth commission for Aceh.⁴¹ Yet, in Aceh, except for financial reparation and political integration (restorative measures), punitive justice and the reconciliation agenda proved to be an utter failure. The proposed human rights court for Aceh has never been set up despite a law calling for its establishment. A truth commission has not been officially established because it is supposed to operate under the framework of a national truth and reconciliation commission, which was ruled unconstitutional.⁴²

Kimura (2015) argues that implicated elites in Indonesia have employed various strategies to maneuver and circumvent the democratic system to hamper justice and reconciliation as well as to prevent themselves from being a target of legal accountability. One such way is reflected in the redefinition and rearticulation of the concepts of justice and reconciliation in a politicized arena. Many groups, international and local alike, have turned to alternative forms of justice that employ traditional, cultural, and/or religious practices. While successful in some instances, Kimura (2015: 74) argues that forms of “traditional” and, in particular, Islamic justice have also been used to avoid and even undermine forms of accountability.⁴³

In the case of the anticommunist violence in 1965-66, most disappointingly, the state has never been compelled to adopt such measures to come to terms with its past. It is civil society and activists working on human rights issues that have insisted the state settle the case and right its past wrongs by adopting measures for truth and justice. In the early years of *Reformasi*, state institutions responded to some of these calls and initiated both policies addressing the 1965 tragedy and attempts to promote national reconciliation.⁴⁴ However, most of these projects at the central-state level have failed to be completed or implemented. Since there has been stagnation at the national level in dealing with issues of truth and justice relating to the mass violence in the mid-1960s, in the last few years NGOs and victims’ groups alike have undertaken more grassroots and community-based activities at the local level.⁴⁵ Yet, at the national level, the state has still treated communism as “the latent threat.”⁴⁶

The Indonesian case shows that the analytical utility of the preexisting theories must be kept in mind with certain caveats and scope conditions. In the case of East Timor, the emergence of some justice measures seems to be better explained by strong international pressure, as presumed by the justice cascade thesis. Yet, for the

41 Ehito Kimura, “The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” *Southeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 1 (2015): 73-93.

42 Edward Aspinall and Fajran Zain, “Transitional Justice Delayed in Aceh, Indonesia,” in *Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Renée Jeffery and Hun Joon Kim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87-123.

43 Kimura, “The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.”

44 Rohana Kuddus, “The Ghosts of 1965: Politics and Memory in Indonesia,” *New Left Review*, no. 104 (2017): 45-92.

45 Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem, “Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society Initiatives for the 1965 Mass Violence in Indonesia,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 32, no. 3 (2013): 115-42.

46 Kuddus, “The Ghosts of 1965: Politics and Memory in Indonesia.”

case of post-Suharto transition in general, the strong demand and the significant involvement of norm entrepreneurs and the normative diffusion of the justice conception has not been easily transposed and translated into official policies in Indonesia. As Kimura (2015: 74) observes, “the attempt to build a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) emerged from activists and civil society organizations but came to be coopted into a law that would emphasize amnesty over accountability.”⁴⁷ The Indonesian case also reveals a lack of analytical attention to the reverse of transitional justice: impunity. Also, in Indonesia, the previous studies have shown the diverse forms of localized justice applied selectively for different cases, albeit under the same democratic transition. This dynamic calls for the need of disaggregating the analytical unit of transitional justice. It may be more productive to treat a specific case of human rights abuse, instead the country-level case, as the unit of analysis.

IV. Alternative Paths of Transitional Justice

From the empirical discussion in the previous section, one common insight is that elites’ political decisions are the key mechanism (proximate cause) in getting to transitional justice. This seems obvious in almost all cases. Yet, the remaining question is then to understand under what conditions elites would have incentive to pursue justice processes. The experience of Southeast Asian countries shows that the logic of power balance and modes of transition seems to apply only limitedly, while justice cascade and norms diffusion is most useful in explaining the driving force behind the demand of transitional justice, but not always helpful in making sense of the eventual outcome of the implementation process. In addition, to assess the preexisting theories, an empirical look at the Southeast Asian experiences allows us to identify other causal factors that plausibly explain various outcomes of transitional justice. From the previous discussion, this section highlights three potential alternative explanatory variables.

The first alternative path is that the actual outcomes of justice measures may depend on the localized notion of what counts as “justice.” This is shown, in particular, from the case of transitional justice in Indonesia and East Timor. In the Tanjung Priok case where military officers responsible for the violence against Muslims in a Jakarta neighborhood proposed to settle matters through *islah*, an Islamic form of peace making rather than resorting to judicial channels. In Aceh, practices of *diyat* and *peusijuek* have led to debates about whether to use alternative or traditional forms of reconciliation or national legal mechanisms to prosecute individuals. While proponents have argued that these cultural practices offer an alternative way to resolve conflicts, critics have derided the cooptation of Islamic and traditional principles for their own self-protection.

The second alternative explanation is that the outcome of justice depends on the le-

47 Kimura, “The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia.”

gitimacy of the past violence. Legitimacy of the past violence refers to the way in which violent and repressive actions committed by the regime are framed and institutionalized in the collective memory of the society. In turn, legitimacy is indicated by how much this frame is accepted and congruent with popular narratives. Violence can be framed as legitimate when the target of violence is deemed as threatening and the regime can incite popular participation in committing violence. Different frames of legitimacy may be framed by different actors—for instance, an official state narrative versus an international normative frame—which in turn affect the extent of popular pressure and shape different political calculations of the elites. In the case of East Timor, the stronger support from international communities for the pursuit of independence and subsequent justice processes is partly due to the frame of illegitimate occupation. East Timor was not previously part of Indonesia, and therefore the invasion by Suharto in 1975 calls for the strong normative urge to observe international norms of self-determination. In reverse, the greatest challenge to fight against impunity and the near absence of any efforts to address the 1965-66 anticommunist massacres is to deconstruct a strongly cultivated narrative which sees the abolition of anticommunism as not only legitimate, but also necessary for the existence of the Indonesian republic, as communists were constructed in the official historical texts as treacherous and dangerous.

Lastly, the outcomes—and especially the timing—of transitional justice implementation may also depend on the level of complicity of current elites in the past conflict. Complicity here refers to the degree of involvement of the present ruling or dominant elites in perpetrating violence and to what extent their power and influence are compromised by the pursuit of transitional justice. In this sense, the more dominant elites—especially those who are in the security forces—are entrenched and implicated with the past conflicts, the more obstacles are in place for the pursuit of transitional justice. In this sense, rather than coming as a function of the balance of power vis-à-vis outgoing regime, the incentive to pursue justice comes from elites' consideration of how much power or influence they are going to lose when the state discloses the truth or conducts trials. This factor seems to explain the culture of impunity in Indonesia and the Philippines, in which elements of power patronage from the Suharto and Marcos eras that helped the dictators commit violence still have a strong grip in political office and the security apparatus. Another analytical utility of this explanation is that it can better make sense of the reason why transitional justice policies are often adopted in gradual or delayed implementation—such as those that took place in the Cambodian case.

In adjudicating the relative significance of these three alternative factors, we need to evaluate how much they affect political elites' decisions, which is the proximate cause of the type and timing of transitional justice in all cases we observe. Looking through this optic, one can say that the interaction of two variables—legitimacy of past violence and complicity of current elites in the past conflicts—serves as two fundamental reasons that shape political elites' decisions. While the distinctive, localized, notion of justice still matters,

one can assume that these notions are more malleable to the incentives and stakes that the political elites have. Therefore, legitimacy and complicity come as decisive variables that shape the structure of stakes and incentives of the political elites.

In this sense, this alternative view concurs with the power balance and the justice cascade theory in highlighting that elites' political decisions are the key mechanism (proximate cause) in getting to transitional justice. Yet, my underlying assumption about elites' political calculation differs from them. Rather than a function of balance of power *vis-à-vis* the outgoing regime, I contend that the incentive to pursue justice comes from elites' consideration of how much stake they will have in facing demands for justice. The first variable, the legitimacy of past violence, corresponds to the stake from popular pressure. The second variable, the complicity in the past conflict, corresponds to the stake from the institutional process of justice. Therefore, exploring the interaction of these two plausible factors may benefit students of transitional justice to develop a more dynamic explanation.

V. Conclusion

Throughout this empirical analysis of transitional justice in Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, and Indonesia, I have demonstrated the utility and the pitfalls of two predominant theories of transitional justice. I found that the power balance theory pioneered by Huntington (1991) is either wrong or incomplete to make sense of the empirical realities of various transitional justice outcomes. The theory, while seemingly logically sound, errs in two crucial empirical respects. First, the hypothesized outcomes “punish or forget” diverged from the actual outcomes, such as in the Philippines. Moreover, the political decision to pursue transitional justice does not seem to depend purely on power relations during transition. Second, instead of emerging in the immediate aftermath of transition (as Huntington postulates), in many cases, the pursuit and implementation of transitional justice policies seem to take place more intensively as the country moves further from the transition moment to the consolidation period.

The “justice cascade” thesis, on the other hand, is at most useful in explaining the emergence of popular or international pressure on the state. But, the demand-side account is not sufficient to explain under what conditions societal and international pressures will translate into institutional adoption.

While this paper does not aim to provide an alternative theory, my empirical analysis advances three other plausible causal factors that seem to help explain the diverse outcomes of the types of transitional justice in Southeast Asia: a) the distinctive, locally based, notion of justice; b) the frame and narrative of legitimacy of past violence; and c) the degree of complicity and entrenchment of current ruling elites in past conflict. A more developed explanation of how these alternative pathways explains the type of transitional justice process certainly requires further and deeper inquiry.

Acknowledgements

I thank William Hurst for his comments the first version of this paper that I developed for his course, Law and Politics in Authoritarian and Developing Countries, at Northwestern. I am also grateful for the comments from two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest as reported by the author(s)

Funding

This work is developed in my graduate study which is supported by the Arryman Scholarship, funded by the Indonesian Scholarship and Research Support Foundation (ISRSF).

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The Role Of Oligarchy In Local Elections Funding: A Case Study Of Central Sulawesi

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Abstract

How do oligarchs finance local elections, and what motivates their involvement? This study aims to examine the involvement of oligarchs in funding elections campaigns in Central Sulawesi. The research design uses case studies. This study found that oligarchs were, directly and indirectly, involved in local election activities. They become part of candidates' campaign teams, finance political activities, play a role in issuing parties' recommendations, mobilise mass campaigns, pay political consultants, control public opinion, distribute social assistance and design political parties coalitions. The involvement of oligarchs in local election activities is motivated by their desire to promote political parties in Central Sulawesi and the interests of running a business. This orientation of growing political parties is more dominant in influencing oligarchs to be involved in local elections, rather than the orientation of maintaining their business continuity. This finding shows that there is a shift in the orientation of entrepreneurs in providing political support. From previously conducting such support secretly, now oligarchs are bolder to appear in public as administrators of political parties, success teams and supporting political financing.

Keywords: oligarchy, local election, funding, Central Sulawesi.

1. Introduction

Ahead of the 2020 direct local elections (*pemilihan kepala daerah langsung/pilkada*), the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Mahfud M.D., issued a surprising statement that the majority of candidates for regional

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heads in Indonesia are financed by *cukong* (entrepreneurs). Previously, in the 2017 and 2018 pilkada, a study conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) stated that 82.3% of regional head candidates admitted to being sponsored by donors with business backgrounds.⁵¹ The high cost of politics is allegedly the reason the candidates for regional heads need the help of entrepreneurs. Candidates for regional heads require substantial campaign costs and media rentals.⁵² A candidate who wants to run in local elections needs political costs of Rp 20 to 30 billion (approximately USD 1.4 to 2.1 million) to compete in the district/city level elections and Rp 30 to 100 billion (approximately USD 2.1 to 7 million) to contest the gubernatorial election. On the other hand, entrepreneurs are interested in controlling assets, resources and development projects in the region.⁵³

The interdependence between politicians and private entrepreneurs has implications for increasing corruption cases in the regions. The KPK noted that 429 regional heads resulting from direct regional elections from 2005 to 2020 were entangled in corruption cases.⁵⁴ In Central Sulawesi, corruption involving the regional head ensnared the Buol Regent, Amran Batalipu, and the Banggai Laut Regent, Weny Bukamo. Amran was charged with accepting bribes in the form of local elections funding for granting recommendations for palm oil permits. Like Amran, Weny Bukamo is suspected of allegedly receiving bribes from businessmen (contractors) for campaign costs and the ‘dawn attack’ (early morning vote buying) in the Banggai Laut Pilkada.⁵⁵ The KPK arrested Amran Batalipu and Weny Bukamo ahead of local elections in 2012 and 2020.

Entrepreneurs’ support for candidates is not something that comes free. Once elected, regional heads reciprocate the support of entrepreneurs by distributing development projects and granting business permits and public policies that benefit them. In Sumenep Regency (East Java), political investors who provided financial support to candidates received economic benefits by placing people close to them in regional government-owned enterprises (BUMD) engaged in the oil and gas sector. Political investors also gain political access in the placement of bureaucratic officials and facilitate government projects.⁵⁶

This study aims to provide a descriptive explanation of the role of politicians and entrepreneurs (oligarchs) in local elections. This study complements previous findings regard-

51 Elih Dalilah et al., “Benturan Kepentingan Pada Pendanaan Pilkada,” *Jurnal Antikorupsi INTEGRITAS* 5, no. 1 (2019): 181-88, <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v5i1.391>.

52 Marcus Mietzner, “Funding Pilkada: Illegal Campaign Financing in Indonesia’s Local Elections,” in *The State and Illegality in Indonesia*, vol. 269, *Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010), 123-38.

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54 Detik.com, “Pimpinan KPK Catat Ada 429 Kepala Daerah Hasil Pilkada Terjerat Korupsi,” Detik.com, 2021.

55 Kompas, “OTT Bupati Banggai Laut: Uang Suap Hasil Atur Lelang Proyek Akan Dipakai Untuk Serangan Fajar Pilkada,” Kompas, 2020, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/05/06534021/ott-bupati-banggai-laut-uang-suap-hasil-aturl-lelang-proyek-akan-dipakai?page=all>.

56 Mohammad Hidayaturrahman, Bonaventura Ngarawula, and Kridawati Sadhana, “Political Investors: Political Elite Oligarchy and Mastery of Regional Resources in Indonesia,” *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, n.d., 1-13, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2057891120917213>.

ing the emergence of wealthy local elites who dominate local politics in Batam, the direct involvement of private entrepreneurs in elections in North Sumatra and East Java,⁵⁷ and the ability of entrepreneurs to survive in various types of regimes in Pekalongan.⁵⁸ This study differs from the previous ones because it was conducted in Central Sulawesi, one of the regions in Indonesia that is experiencing relatively rapid growth in foreign capital investment. The presence of investments in Central Sulawesi simultaneously emerged with groups of entrepreneurs who manage mining business permits and oil palm plantations. Besides conducting business activities, these businessmen are also active in politics. They were directly and indirectly involved in financing candidates in the 2020 gubernatorial elections.

Therefore, the central question of this study is how do oligarchs influence local elections through financing, and what motivates them to get involved? This study does not attempt to explain why this happened, nor does it intend to explain the impact or implications of the oligarchy's involvement in local elections.

This article consists of four parts. The first part discusses the theoretical framework of the study. The second part describes the case selection method. The third part elaborates the process and dynamics of the gubernatorial elections in Central Sulawesi, including its financing activities and the role of oligarchs in local elections. The final part concludes.

2. Theoretical Framework

In classical terminology, oligarchy is defined as the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of people. Winters (2011) criticises this concept because, according to him, it muddles the definition of oligarchs and elites. He revises the concept of oligarchy by first dividing five individual power resources, including political rights, official position power in a government or organisation, coercive power, mobilising power, and material power.⁵⁹ A person is an oligarch if they control material resources in a concentrated manner. If the person only controls the first four power resources without having material power, he is not an oligarch but an elite.

According to Winters, oligarchy is the power controlled by super-rich individuals. Winters' terminology is in line with that quoted by Aslund (2005) and Matuszak (2012), where the mention of oligarchy is attached to entrepreneurs who are very rich and have good political connections with power,⁶⁰ or representatives of big business who can influence poli-

57 Nankyung Choi, "Elections, Parties and Elites in Indonesia's Local Politics," *South East Asia Research* 15, no. 3 (2007): 325-54.

58 Amalinda Savirani, "Survival against the Odds: The Djunaid Family of Pekalongan, Central Java," *South East Asia Research* 24, no. 3 (2016): 407-19.

59 Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

60 Anders Aslund, "Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States," *CASE Network Studies and Analyses*, no. 296 (2005), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441910>.

tics for their benefit⁶¹. Oligarchy is also defined as the ownership and exercise of power by a handful of individuals directly or indirectly for personal gain⁶². Direct involvement—such as their participation as executive and legislative officials—could play a role in influencing policy. Indirect involvement may take the form, for example, of their becoming a financier or supporter of political parties⁶³.

Robison and Hadiz define oligarchy as a power relationship between a group of people who control economic and political resources for their own sake.⁶⁴ The concept of oligarchy in this study refers to the opinion of Robison and Hadiz. This definition is more appropriate to explain the behaviour of groups of politicians and businessmen at the subnational level without categorising the players based on the size of the owned assets. This approach is beneficial because finding a group of super-rich politicians and businessmen at the subnational level—including Central Sulawesi—is a difficult task due to the unavailability of reliable data. Most local entrepreneurs only have businesses locally, and their assets are challenging to identify because they are not officially published or reported. However, locals widely recognise them as businessmen and politicians.

3. Setting and Design of the Research

This research focuses on Central Sulawesi, one of the regions in Indonesia that has been experiencing relatively rapid growth of foreign direct investment. The data from the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) shows that, for the last three years (2019-2021), Central Sulawesi has been included in the top five provinces in Indonesia that have become the

61 Sławomir Matuszak, *The Oligarchic Democracy. The Influence of Business Groups on Ukrainian Politics* (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, 2012), <https://www.cceol.com/search/book-detail?id=550272>.

62 John T. Evans, "The Decline of Oligarchy in Seventeenth-Century Norwich," *Journal of British Studies* 14, no. 1 (November 1974): 46-76, <https://doi.org/10.1086/385666>. were the most affluent citizens, and were linked by close family ties. Comparatively few studies have been made of officeholders of the seventeenth century, especially for the period after 1660, yet the evidence so far accumulated suggests that officeholding remained the exclusive privilege of a closed social elite. Nevertheless, Norwich may provide an instructive exception. An examination of the pool of men eligible for political office in Norwich, the largest provincial capital, indicates that the door to political office was open to men of diverse social backgrounds and occupations to a greater extent than during the sixteenth century and apparently much more so than in the other large provincial capitals. Oligarchy may be defined as the possession and exercise of power by a few individuals either directly, as a consequence of holding the important political offices, or indirectly, as a consequence of controlling recruitment of officeholders and influencing their decisions. In the former case, which was the general pattern established in those fifteenth and sixteenth-century towns which remained free from the intervention of territorial magnates, oligarchy implies further that the magistrates have either the exclusive privilege of appointing their own replacements or the ability to manipulate the mechanism of political recruitment involving a wider electorate through control of the processes of nomination and election of officeholders." "container-title": "Journal of British Studies", "DOI": "10.1086/385666", "ISSN": "0021-9371, 1545-6986", "issue": "1", "language": "en", "note": "publisher: Cambridge University Press", "page": "46-76", "source": "Cambridge University Press", "title": "The Decline of Oligarchy in Seventeenth-Century Norwich", "volume": "14", "author": [{"family": "Evans", "given": "John T."}], "issued": [{"date-parts": [{"1974", 11}]}], "schema": "https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"

63 Stanislav Markus and Volha Charnysh, "The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 50, no. 12 (October 2017): 1632-65, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688000>.

64 Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (Routledge, 2004).

focus destinations for foreign investment.⁶⁵ Direct foreign investment in Central Sulawesi in 2021 ranks third in Indonesia after West Java and DKI Jakarta and ranks first for provinces outside Java.

Increased investment in Central Sulawesi correlates with the growing number of mining and palm oil plantations permits. According to the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources data, until 2021, there have been 445 mining business permits in Central Sulawesi. Furthermore, the KOMIU NGO noted an increase in palm oil plantations from 123,279 Ha in 2018 to 152,231 Ha in 2020. Entrepreneurs active in the mining and palm oil plantation sectors are also known for their involvement in financing candidates in the local elections. The competition between entrepreneurs to secure permits drives them to be directly or indirectly involved in local elections. Based on that observation, discussing elections in Central Sulawesi could be an illustrative case study in observing the operation of politicians and entrepreneurs (oligarchs) in financing local elections in Indonesia.

This paper uses the case study method. Research data was obtained through desk study and field study. The desk study aimed to develop a database of pairs of regional head candidates who had registered with the KPU. The primary information collected is the profile of the candidate, the members of the candidates' campaign teams, the amount of candidates' wealth as stated in the State Official's Wealth Report (LHKPN), and monitoring of local mass media to track elections dynamics.

The field study involved in-depth interviews in exploring intensive information from the resource persons. The primary data sources in this study include 18 individuals, consisting of three academics, four political party administrators, two personal staff of political party leaders, three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) representatives, two representatives of survey agencies, one local media journalist, two representatives of the companies that operate in Central Sulawesi, and one commissioner of the local Elections Commission (KPU). The selection of informants from academia, NGOs, the KPU, survey agencies, and the media was motivated by their understanding of the dynamics of local politics. We selected political parties and staff members due to their involvement as a campaign team (*tim sukses* or *timses*) for regional head candidates or as a part of the political parties that nominated the candidates. Furthermore, the selection of company representatives is needed to get their perspectives regarding the correlation between businesses operating at the local level and local political competition. It is important to note that the study does not attempt to establish a causal relationship but only explains how the oligarchy is involved in local political contestation.⁶⁶

65 BKPM RI, "REALISASI PENANAMAN MODAL PMDN-PMA," BKPM, 2021, <https://www.bkpm.go.id/id/publikasi/si-aran-pers/readmore/2420901/71001>.

66 John Gerring, "Mere Description," *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (October 2012): 721-746, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000130>.

4. Analysis

A. The 2020 Central Sulawesi Governor Elections

Two pairs of candidates—Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala and Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir—competed in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial elections. Seven political parties supported the Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala pair. Two political parties held seats in the Provincial People's Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* or DPRD)—i.e., the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya* or Gerindra) and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* or PDIP), with 12 seats in total. The other five parties came from non-parliamentary parties, namely the Berkarya Party, The Moon and Crescent Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang* or PBB), The Indonesian Solidarity Party (*Partai Solidaritas Indonesia* or PSI), The Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* or PKPI), and the Gelora Party. In total, this pair was supported by 12 DPRD seats or equivalent to 26.6% of the local parliamentary seats. This number was more than enough to nominate a pair of candidates.

Meanwhile, a 'fat coalition' supported the pair of Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir. The coalition consisted of one non-parliamentary party (*Garuda Party*) and nine parties holding DPRD seats including the Nasdem Party (*Partai Nasional Demokrat* or Nasdem), the Golkar Party, The People's Conscience Party (*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* or Hanura), the Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat* or PD), the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or PKS), the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or PPP), the United Indonesia Party (*Partai Persatuan Indonesia* or Perindo) and the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or PAN). Overall, this pair was supported by ten political parties with 33 seats or equivalent to 73.4% of the total seats in the Central Sulawesi DPRD.

The two pairs of candidates had diverse backgrounds, regional origins and different political experiences (see Table 1). The Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir pair was a combination of politicians and bureaucrats. Both are seasoned politicians. Rusdy Mastura started his career as a member of the Palu City DPRD. He then served as the Mayor of Palu for two terms, from 2005 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2015. Meanwhile, Ma'mun Amir started his career as a bureaucrat. He was the Deputy Regent of Banggai, Regent of Banggai, and a member of the DPD RI. In addition, the Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir pair was a combination of two figures from different regions, Rusdy Mastura representing the western region of Central Sulawesi (Palu area), and Ma'mun Amir from the Eastern part of Central Sulawesi (Luwuk area). The two areas—Palu City and Banggai Regency—are inhabited by the majority of the population from different ethnicities. Rusdy Mastura comes from the *Kaili* ethnic group, an indigenous ethnic group inhabiting Central Sulawesi. Meanwhile, Ma'mun Amir comes

from the *Babasal* ethnic group—*Banggai*, *Balantak*, *Saluan*—the majority ethnic group that occupies the eastern part of Central Sulawesi. Mam'mun Amir was also the son of the last King of Banggai, Sukran Aminuddin Amir.

Table 1. Profiles of Candidates for Governor and Vice Governor of Central Sulawesi Province

Name	Profile	Power Resources
Rusdy Mastura	He served as Mayor of Palu for two terms and was once a Golkar elite in Palu City and Donggala Regency. However, he was better known as a leader of the Pancasila Youth Organization (Pemuda Pancasila).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisational official position (Chairman of Provincial Board of the Nasdem Party) - Mobilization (Pemuda Pancasila, Golkar, Nasdem Party cadre). - Size of wealth: approx. Rp 6.3 billion (USD 440,150)
Ma'mun Amir	He has a long career in the local bureaucracy. He was elected as the Regent of Luwuk and as a member of the DPD RI. He is known to be from a noble family from Luwuk Banggai. His father was the last King of Banggai.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mobilisation (positions previously held and their lineages could potentially mobilise the Luwuk- Banggai people (Luwuk Regency, Banggai Laut Regency and Banggai Islands Regency). - Size of wealth: approx. Rp 7.3 billion (USD 510,000) and has been identified as having business relations with the Central Group, a private company operating in Luwuk
Hidayat Lamakarate	He started his career as a civil servant after graduating from the Home Affairs Civil Servant Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri or APDN) and occupied important positions in the bureaucracy as the Regional Secretary of Central Sulawesi Province, the Acting Mayor of Palu City and Banggai Laut Regency, and the Secretary Central Sulawesi. He has a close relationship with Longky Djanggola (Governor of Central Sulawesi 2011-2021 and Chairman of the DPD Gerindra Central Sulawesi). His wife is a member of the Central Sulawesi DPRD from the Gerindra Party. He comes from a family of officials and nobles. His father was the former Mayor of Palu and a descendant of royalty from the Tojo kingdom.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Official positions (Chairman of PMI Central Sulawesi, Chair of the Central Sulawesi Swimming Association, Chair of the Central Sulawesi Scout Provincial Quarter, Commander of the University Student Regiment (Resimen Mahasiswa or Menwa) of Central Sulawesi, and Secretary of Central Sulawesi Province. - Mobilisation (the organisational positions held and connections with the governor and the Gerindra party could potentially mobilise people within the organisation). - Size of wealth Rp 1.6 billion (USD 111,800)
Bartholomeus Tandigala	As a civil engineering graduate, he started as a civil servant in the public works department. He has held several strategic positions as Head of the Department of Public Works, Investment, Mining and Energy, Disaster Management Agency and Acting Regent of Morowali. The position is known as a 'wet job' (ripe for corruption) because it manages a large budget. He is also known as Longky Djanggola's confidant. In addition, he is also considered a representative of Christianity (the second-largest religion after Islam).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Official positions (the Chairman of the Ecclesiastical Choir Fest, the Chairman of the Central Sulawesi Takraw Association, the Head of Central Sulawesi BPBD). - Mobilisation (religious organisation positions can potentially mobilise Christian groups). - Size of wealth Rp 5.9 billion (USD 412,221).

SOURCE: PROCESSED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, 2021.

The pair of Hidayat-Bartho has a different background story. They built their careers as local bureaucrats. Hidayat Lamakarate served as the Regional Secretary of Central

Sulawesi Province and was appointed as an Acting Regent of Banggai Laut and Acting Mayor of Palu. Bartholomeus served as the Head of the Manpower and Transmigration Bureau of Central Sulawesi and was promoted as the Head of the Provincial Disaster Mitigation Agency. Bartho once served as an Acting Regent of Morowali. Both Hidayat and Bartho decided to retire early to participate in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial elections. Apart from being younger, the Hidayat-Bartho couple also represents different socio-ethnoreligious backgrounds. Hidayat Lamakarate is a Muslim, the majority religion of the people of Central Sulawesi, while Bartholomeus Tandigala is a Christian, the second most common religion adopted by the people of Central Sulawesi, who mostly live in Poso Regency, North Morowali Regency, and parts of Sigi Regency. This identity (ethnicity and religion) is often an essential aspect for elites to win political contestations in Central Sulawesi Province.

Based on the wealth reports, Ma'mun Amir is the candidate with the highest assets valuation, totalling Rp 7,342,576,494 (USD 510,000), followed by Rusdy Mastura with Rp 6,352,695,600 (USD 440,150), Bartholomeus Tandigala with Rp 5,953,572,000 (USD 412,221), and Hidayat Lamakarate with Rp 1,622,126,608 (USD 111,800).

Regarding campaign funding, based on the elections campaign funds donation reports (*Laporan Penerimaan Dana Kampanye* or LPDK), the Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala pair reported that their campaign fund donations reached Rp 5.5 billion (USD 383,586). Meanwhile, the Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir pair had campaign fund donations of Rp 4.2 billion (USD 292,920). Furthermore, based on the official statement of income and expenditure of campaign funds, the Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala pair were the candidates who received the most campaign funds. This pair were also the candidates with the largest campaign spending. Meanwhile, the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair received and spent only half of the total amount issued by Hidayat-Bartho (see Table 2).

Table 2. Report of Fund Campaign (in IDR)

Item		Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala	Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir
A. Campaign Fund Receipts		Rp. 8,041,669,021.00	Rp. 4,590,002,336.13
	A1. Donation Acceptance	Rp. 5,501,805,000.00	Rp. 4,276,000,000.00
	A2. Miscellaneous Receipts	Rp. 2,539,864,021.00	Rp. 314,002,336.13
B. Campaign expenditures		Rp. 8,025,174,726.00	Rp. 4,234,656,257.23
	B1. Expenses	Rp. 6,184,685,550.00	Rp. 3,214,642,750.00
	B2. Miscellaneous expenses	Rp. 1,840,489,176.00	Rp. 1,020,013,507.23
C. Debt		Rp -	Rp -
D. Balance		Rp. 16,494,295.00	Rp. 355,346,078.90

SOURCE: GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION OF CENTRAL SULAWESI PROVINCE, 2021.

Based on the KPU's e-recap on 28 December, 2020, the pair of Rusdy Mastura and Ma'mun Amir received approximately 60% of the votes. This result was then confirmed by the official tally, in which Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir won the elections with 891,334 votes, equivalent to 59.61% of the total votes.

Suppose one tries to directly correlate the elections result and the size of the campaign funds. In that case, one could be misled to conclude that there is no linear correlation between the size of the candidates' campaign funds and the final elections results. The data shows that the Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir pair spent less than the pair of Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala. Still, the former was more successful in gaining votes than the latter. However, the financial statement is, at best, inaccurate. Based on our research, the candidates' actual expenditures were much more significant than the official financial statement reported to the local KPU.

B. Elections Financing Activities

Elections financing in this article refers to all types of political funding—both legal and illegal—to fund the activities of political parties and elections campaigns, particularly campaign events conducted by the candidates, supporting political parties, and independent donations.⁶⁷ Political expenses fall into at least five types of costs. The first budget post is the remuneration for witnesses at polling stations. The second budget post is the provision of campaign paraphernalia (e.g., costumes, calendars, merchandise, and hand sanitiser), campaign equipment as well as food and beverage of the teams, and campaign team operational costs. The third budget post is the legal dispute-related costs, including the money to pay for lawyers and transportation costs of the witnesses if they have to solve disputes at the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* or MK), including to challenge the decisions of election organisers. The fourth budget post is the political dowry or candidacy buying. Candidates allocate this post to buy political parties' support during the nomination process. The final budget is the survey costs, i.e., the costs allocated to pay survey agencies and political consultants.

A PDIP politician stated the need for witness remuneration:

Logistics for political costs in the field are needed to fight in the *Pilkada* (direct local elections). So, coincidentally, the PDIP was entrusted to handle witnesses at polling stations. The fund for this budget item comes from the candidate who deposited a sum of money with the Party Central Board (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP). The DPP did not take the funds; when needed, the DPP will return the money to the region and distribute it to each district. And the witness fee is there. I don't need to mention the amount, but it is there. Every district/city and province that holds *Pikada* needs

67 Elin Falguera, Samuel Jones, and Magnus Ohman, *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance* (Idea, 2015).

to allocate witness fees. We manage the witness fees, and we also manage the ballot counting at each polling station. Even though there are shortcomings, it enriches our experience so that it will be even better in the future.⁶⁸

A similar expression regarding the need for witness remuneration was also narrated by a PKB politician who supported the pair of Rusdy-Ma'mun:

We paid Rp 200,000 (USD 14) per witness yesterday, but there is also food and training, so it is approximately Rp 350,000 (USD 24) per witness, and we need 6,310 witnesses.⁶⁹

An interview with a Gerindra politician also reveals the amount of money needed to fund the other budget posts:

The cost of our witnesses is around Rp 2.5-3 billion (USD 174,450 to USD 209,422), and this is calculated based on the number of more than 6,000 polling stations, with an estimate that each witness will receive around Rp 350,000 to Rp 600,000 (USD 24.5 to USD 42). This amount can change according to the location. Remote areas and islands require additional fees. Then the t-shirt printing costs; we usually only produce t-shirts for 30 percent of the total number of voters. One t-shirt costs Rp 11,000 to Rp 12,000 (less than a dollar). Then the costs for equipment and campaign F&B (snack, tents, and speaker rental) is approximately Rp 3 million ((USD 210) with a capacity of 50 participants (to follow the health protocols). According to the campaign sites, the campaign team's operational costs (rent for lodging and meals) are also expensive; one day, it can reach 7-12 sites for the candidates. So, the total operational costs for one day can be multiplied up to 14-24 sites. One site could cost Rp 6-7 million (USD 418 to 488). That's for the 26 September-6 December campaign schedule, deducted by 14 days because, usually, the candidates attend activities outside the campaign schedule, such as going to the KPU or the Elections Monitoring Body (*Badan Pengawas Pemilu* or Bawaslu), so it's about 57 days in total. Then vehicle rental for one car costs Rp 2.5 million (USD 175). The number of vehicles for the governor candidate is 6-7 cars. For the deputy governor, 4-6 cars. So in total, we need to rent 10-13 cars. Then we also need to count the cost of fuel for one car per day, approximately Rp 300,000 (USD 21). Then other campaign paraphernalia (calendars, masks, hand sanitiser, merchandise, and credit). Then the operational costs for the volunteer teams—one site is Rp 3 million (USD 210). Then finally, there is preparation for a dispute in the Constitutional Court. Hiring a lawyer and bringing witnesses requires at least Rp 5 billion (USD 348,903).⁷⁰

Based on interviews, the total costs borne by a pair of candidates is approximately Rp 35 billion (USD 2.4 million) (see Table 3). Of this amount, the operational costs

68 Interview with a PDIP politician, Palu, January 18, 2021

69 Interview with a PKB politician, Palu, January 15, 2021.

70 Interview with a Gerindra politician, Palu, February 15, 2021.

of the campaign team take the lion's share of the total expenditure, reaching 27%, followed by t-shirt printing 20%, legal fees to dispute the result at the Constitutional Court 14%, volunteer operational costs 11%, campaign equipment and F&B 11%, witness remuneration 8%, and vehicle rentals. Table 3 summarises the estimated expenses for witnesses, campaigns and disputes for one of the two pairs of candidates in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial election:

Table 3. Estimated Costs for Witnesses, Campaign and Elections Dispute in Central Sulawesi (in USD)

Type of Cost	Amount (in USD)
Witnesses	209,183
Campaign equipment	285,883
T-shirt printing	509,012
Campaign team operational expenses	662,413
Vehicle rental	139,455
Volunteer operational costs	285,883
Legal dispute at the Constitutional Court	348,638
Total	2,440,467

SOURCE: PROCESSED FROM INTERVIEWS WITH POLITICIANS, 2021.

This number does not include the cost of political dowries to secure political parties' support (candidacy buying). Based on the interviews, the market price of parties' support in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial election starts at Rp 500 million - Rp 1.5 billion (USD 34,870 to USD 104,609) per seat in the Central Sulawesi local parliament (DPRD). Regarding the cost of political dowries, one informant told the following:

So we are in a meeting and there is one party asking for Rp 5 billion (USD 348,681), and that's normal for the provincial level. Still, this candidate did not immediately respond because he first communicated with the main supporting party. Suddenly another candidate came to the party who asked for Rp 5 billion. This one came and bought Rp 15 billion (USD 1.4 million) from the party, and so in the end this one party disappeared. So, we also regret that this candidate and the party were slow.⁷¹

Another informant also shared comments on the political dowry:

So there was a party that already set a deal for Rp 1 billion per seat (USD 69,743). It turned out that on the final day of candidate registration, the party increased the dowry to Rp 1.5 billion (USD 104,609). They said that it was a request from the DPP. This candidate has the money to pay, but he was disappointed because the party vi-

⁷¹ Interview with party chairman staff, Jakarta, February 11, 2021.

olated the initial commitment. He eventually left this party.⁷²

We can assume, therefore, that one seat in the DPRD is valued at Rp 1 billion (USD 69,743). If 30 seats in the local parliament support a pair of candidates, then the total cost of political dowry could be as high as Rp 30 billion (USD 2.1 million).

Another budget post is the fees to pay survey agencies and political consultants, as quoted from an interview with one of the coordinators of a survey agency:

The survey fees for each agency vary, but generally, it starts from Rp 50 million (USD 3,484) - Rp 150 million (USD10,451) per survey with a sample of 400 respondents. If the sample size is 800 or 1,200 respondents, then, of course, it is more expensive. Apart from the sample size, the credibility and trust in the agency—for example, an agency with a proven track record—can also increase the price. Then, geographical conditions (e.g., islands and remote areas) and demographics (population) make it more expensive. Apart from surveys, if you also play a double role as a consultant, that will also increase the price.⁷³

Two national survey agencies—*Poltracking Indonesia* and *Charta Politika*—released survey results in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial election. A survey coordinator of one of the survey agencies stated:

Yesterday we did three surveys with a sample of 1,200 respondents. In addition to the survey, our agency was also a consultant for one of the competing pairs.⁷⁴

Based on the interviews, the estimated cost of a survey with a sample size of 1,200 respondents, three visits to the field, and consulting fees may reach Rp 1-2 billion (USD 69,743 - USD 139,486). Thus, if we accumulate campaign costs, political dowries, and survey costs, it is estimated that a candidate for governor for a province like Central Sulawesi requires Rp 37-70 billion (USD 2.58 million to USD 4.88 million). The total estimated cost illustrates that the regional head candidates need significant political financing to participate in elections.

Based on the estimated calculation, it appears that there is a difference of around Rp 18 to 21 billion (USD 1.25 million to USD 1,46 million) between the reported amount of campaign fund donations and the total assets owned by the Rusdy-Ma'mun and Hidayat-Bartho pairs. The difference is a moderate estimate of the campaign costs, including witness fees, campaign equipment, t-shirt printing, campaign team operational costs, vehicle rental, volunteers' operational costs, legal disputes in the Constitutional Court, and political survey and consulting fees. This number will be much bigger when one accounts for the money spent for candidacy buying and vote-buying costs—two “shadow” budget posts for which the amount cannot be known with certainty. This illustrates that even though the donations of campaign funds and wealth

72 STA 1 interview academics, Palu, February 11, 2021.

73 STL 2 Interview Research Institute Survey, February 3, 2021.

74 STL 1 Interview Coordinator Regional Survey, February 7, 2021.

owned by the candidate pairs are accumulated, they cannot cover the political costs that the candidate pairs must spend. This also indicates the need for external funding that is not recorded or reported in the official campaign financial reports.

C. The Role of Oligarchs

The interdependency between private entrepreneurs and the Indonesian state has existed since the independence of the Indonesian state, through the New Order regime, and into the current *Reformasi* era.⁷⁵ In the Sukarno era, the emergence of a group of entrepreneurs was known as ‘client entrepreneurs,’ or entrepreneurs born out of patron-client relationships between political rulers in the bureaucracy and entrepreneurs.⁷⁶ During the New Order era, Suharto’s protectionist policies gave birth to domestic capitalism, which operated through the linkage of bureaucratic politics and conglomerates in a system of patronage and rent-seeking.⁷⁷ Yoshihara Kunio labels such a group of entrepreneurs as pseudo capitalists (*ersatz* capitalism).⁷⁸ The close relations between the political class and business entrepreneurs during the New Order led to the birth of Suharto’s oligarchic power, which was controlled centrally.

Although *Reformasi* brought down Suharto’s regime, oligarchic power persists. Moreover, the oligarchy transformed and became more decentralised.⁷⁹ Oligarchic power grew along with the delegation of authority to subnational governments. In the era of regional autonomy, the involvement of entrepreneurs (businessmen) in local elections has become a common phenomenon, and it can be observed in almost every subnational election. Entrepreneurs’ interests to influence the political policies of subnational officials have always been directed to maintain the continuity of and, if possible, expand their businesses. A local academic states the following:

Of course, politics is following economic opportunities. Now, regarding the management of natural resources, although the central government dominates it, the regions still have the authority to do various strategic things that can influence business. So, this could be the obstacle that entrepreneurs have to deal with...And agreement can be made possible if the entrepreneurs are connected with power.⁸⁰

Additionally, the involvement of entrepreneurs to finance politics is encouraged by politicians who need considerable funds to gain power:

Our elections are expensive. Starting from buying parties, campaigns are also costly, especially when buying votes. So the cost is enormous. And I think that it will be

75 Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Equinox Publishing, 2009).

76 Yahya Muhaimin, *Bisnis Dan Politik: Kebijakan Ekonomi Indonesia 1950-1980* (LP3ES, 1990).

77 Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*.

78 Kunio Yoshihara and Yoshihara Kunio, *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1988).

79 Hadiz and Robison, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*.

80 STA 2 Interview Academics, Palu, February 15, 2021.

difficult for ordinary politicians who are only involved in political parties without any connection with big businesses to win the costly local elections. So, the assumption that the campaigns were financed by the oligarchs is inevitable, especially in, let's say, areas with relatively rich natural resources, for example, palm oil in Buol, North Morowali, Banggai, Morowali.⁸¹

In this context, Central Sulawesi's rich natural resources attract investors to invest their capital and, therefore, they have vested interests to maintain the continuity of their business in the province:

This vast Central Sulawesi has investment opportunities that will attract many people. Because here there is CPM (Citra Palu Mineral), IMIP, there is a new company in North Morowali that is building a smelter. It's kind of like the new industrial centre of North Morowali. These companies all have difficulties, which can only be solved with the government's involvement, so this government will play a significant role. Likewise, the amount of investment that goes into the Special Economic Zone in Palu... The last case in Poso, the rise in the Poso lake level due to the activities of Jusuf Kalla's company (which is chaired by his younger brother, Suhelmi Kalla), is also a problem. I think this business also has an important role. Because Longky's first term was promoted, it could not be separated from the involvement of Jusuf Kalla.⁸²

Therefore, it is not surprising that, during the local elections season, the involvement of entrepreneurs as members of the success team or source of funding became a general phenomenon in the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial elections (see Table 4). One interviewee observes:

When we talk about supporters, it is the ruling elites or oligarchs who are in control of the natural resources sector. They are quite interested, or they have large enough capital, to move a party. Although Rusdy Mastura is more dominant, [the one] behind him is Ahmad Ali, who has a mining concession. There is Anwar Hafid, whom we know during his tenure as the Regent of Morowali, was generous enough to issue a mining business permit.⁸³

81 STN4 Interview NGO, Palu, February 16, 2021.

82 STA2 Interview Academics, Palu, February 15, 2021.

83 STN1 Interview NGO, Palu, January 19, 2021.

Table 4. Businessmen/Politicians Supporting Pairs of Candidates for the Election of Governor and Deputy Governor of Central Sulawesi 2020

Name of Entrepreneurs	Political Position/ Political Party/ Government	Company name (Business Sector)	Remarks
Ahmad Ali	Deputy Chairman of the Nasdem Party / Chairman of the Nasdem Faction of the House of Representatives	1. PT. Oti Eya Abadi (nickel mining) 2. PT. Graha Mining Utama (mining). 3. PT. Graha Agro Utama (trading, plantation, agriculture and forestry). 4. PT. Graha Istika Utama (mining) 5. PT. Tadulako Dirgantara Travel (travel agency)	Chief Advisor of the Rusdy-Ma'mun success team. Ahmad Ali was the one who financed the Rusdy-Ma'mun campaign. PT. Oti Eya Abadi is listed as one of the campaign's donors.
Nilam Sari Lawira (Ahmad Ali's wife)	Chairwoman of the Provincial People's Representative Council of Central Sulawesi	1. PT. Oti Eya Abadi (nickel mining) 2. PT. Graha Agro Utama (trade, plantation, agriculture and forestry). 3. PT. Tadulako Dirgantara Travel (travel agency).	Leader of Rusdy-Ma'mun success team. PT. Oti Eya Abadi is listed as one of the campaign's donors.
Tauhid Lawira (Nilam Sari Lawira brother/ brother-in-law of Ahmad Ali)	Member of Central Sulawesi Regional Advisory Council of Nasdem Party	1. PT. Oti Eya Abadi (nickel mining) 2. PT. Graha Agro Utama (trade, plantation, agriculture and forestry). 3. Metro Sulawesi (media).	Protocol Coordinator of the Rusdy-Ma'mun success team. PT. Oti Eya Abadi is listed as one of the campaign's donors.
Hadianto Rasyid	Chairman of Central Sulawesi Regional Representative Council of Hanura	1. PT. A. Rasma Mulia (crushed stone mining) 2. PT. Taipa Jaya Mandiri (construction, trade, industry, mining, agriculture, and many more).	Board of Directors of the Rusdy-Ma'mun success team). Hanura party is one of the supporters of the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair.
Firman Lapide	Deputy Chairman of the Regional Representative Council of Gerindra Party and Chairman of TIDAR (Gerindra's youth wing) of Central Sulawesi	1. PT. Bintang Alfath Mulia (gold mining) 2. PT. XIN LIU FU Corp (gold mining) 3. PT HONG THAI (pine resin industry) 4. PT. MULTI KEMBANG INDONESIA (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) 5. PT. BESTONE INDONESIA (coal mining) 6. PT. RPS INDONESIA (iron factory)	Chief of volunteers team Sahabat Hidayat Lamakarate. Firman Lapide is one of those who approve the needs of the Hidayat-Bartho success team.
Andi Nur Bangsawan Lamakarate	Deputy Chairman of the Regional Representative Council of Gerindra Party of Central Sulawesi	1. PT. Mitra Karya Agung (nickel mining)	Andi Nur Bangsawan is one of the donors of the Hidayat-Bartho campaign.

SOURCE: AUTHORS (2021).

We found that several entrepreneurs who operate in the mining sector were involved in the “success team” (campaign team) for both pairs of candidates. These businessmen were also involved as administrators of political parties that nominated the two candidate pairs, namely Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir and Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala.

Apart from being part of the success team structure, the three businessmen/politicians—Ahmad Ali, Firman Lapide and Andi Nur Bangsawan Lamakarate—also fi-

nanced the competing pairs. In the 2020 Central Sulawesi gubernatorial elections, Ahmad Ali, his family and his confidants played crucial roles in the victory of the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair. Ahmad Ali served as the Chief Advisor of the Rusdy-Ma'mun Team. Ahmad Ali's wife, Nilam Sari Lawira, occupied a strategic position as the Head of the Rusdy-Ma'mun success team and the Chair of SETRUM (Central Sulawesi for Rusdy-Ma'mun). Ahmad Ali's brother-in-law, Tauhid Lawira, was also a member of the Rusdy-Ma'mun success team. Ahmad Ali's younger brother, Hj. Arnita M. Ali (known as *Hajah Chica*), also the Treasurer of the Nasdem Party in Morowali Regency, was actively involved in campaigning for the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair in the Morowali area. Ahmad Ali also played a role in financing and communicating with the parties that nominated the pair of Rusdy Mastura-Ma'Mun Amir. A member of the success team of the Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir pair said:

For our witness operational costs, we received assistance from businessmen and parties. One of them was Ahmad Ali because he is also [from] Nasdem, Cudy (Rusdy Mastura) is also Nasdem. What we know is that we propose programs, ask for money, and we have money to go.⁸⁴

A journalist from a local media in Central Sulawesi also mentioned the involvement of Ahmad Ali in financing the Rusdy Mastura-Ma'mun Amir campaign:

In terms of logistics, I think Cudy is entirely supplied by Ahmad Ali. Because this is one of Ahmad Ali's strengths—he has a solid commitment to helping people. Among them is to help Cudy. Moreover, he is a party bearer. Combined with the support of the people who really have great sympathy for Cudy...Ahmad Ali once told me that he will put all his power to help Cudy wins the elections.⁸⁵

Ahmad Ali's role in financing the Rusdy-Mastura campaign was also acknowledged by one of the Nasdem politicians in Central Sulawesi.

Pak Mat (Ahmad Ali) helps Nasdem cadres running in local elections, not only *Pak Cudy* but also other areas. And that's natural because he's part of the party; it's an effort to grow the party.⁸⁶

Ahmad Ali played a role in securing the support of political parties that supported Rusdy-Ma'mun. To garner political parties' support, Ahmad Ali held meetings with high-ranking officials of political parties, both at the local and national levels. According to a party staffer:

Ahmad Ali met my boss. *Pak Anwar* also came to meet my boss, but he came at the last second. *Pak Hidayat* also builds communication. It's just that the parties have calculations for the future interests of the parties (Golkar and Nasdem) in Central Sulawesi. Apart from that, other factors are related to the commitments that have been

84 Interview with PKB politician PKB, Palu, January 15, 2021.

85 Interview Local Journalist, Palu, January 8, 2021.

86 Interview with Nasdem politician, Palu, February 15, 2021.

violated.⁸⁷

Ahmad Ali was also actively promoting the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair through social media. Ahmad Ali's active campaign was monitored from a Facebook account with a picture of Ahmad Ali intensely campaigning for the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair during the 2020 gubernatorial elections in Central Sulawesi. Ahmad Ali also utilised several media for campaigning, including *Metro Sulawesi* (print and online media) and *Metro Sulteng* (online media). The two media are indirectly connected to Ahmad Ali. *Metro Sulawesi* was headed up by Tauhid Lawira, a member of the Central Sulawesi Nasdem party and the older brother of Ahmad Ali's wife, Nilam Sari Lawira. The close connection between *Metro Sulawesi* and the Nasdem party can also be observed at the door of the *Metro Sulawesi* office, where the Nasdem Party logo is displayed, making it difficult to distinguish whether the office is the party or the media office.

Ahmad Ali owns several companies and his businesses operate in various sectors (see Table 4). While Ahmad Ali owns the companies himself, he has built partnerships with family, close friends and associates, politicians and other entrepreneurs. One of the companies is PT. Oti Eya Abadi. In 2020, PT. Oti Eya Abadi signed a contract with China Energy Engineering Group Co., Ltd (Energy China) Gezhouba Branch for the mining and transportation of nickel laterite in Indonesia worth USD 160 million. The total mining area is 3,339 hectares, and the laterite nickel ore reserves are about 30 million WMT. The contract lasts four years, covering nickel mining and transportation of 5 million tonnes per year.⁸⁸ In the company's shareholding list, apart from the names of Ahmad Ali's wife and brother-in-law, there are also Abdul Rahim and Ferry Anwar. Apart from being politicians from the Nasdem party, the last two names were also mentioned as confidants of Ahmad Ali. Search results at the General Elections Commission also found PT. Oti Eya Abadi is one of five companies that donated campaign funds to the Rusdy-Ma'mun pair. At the end of 2021, residents reported PT. Oti Eya Abadi on suspicion of mining activities that violate regulations. Before that, in July 2021, an online media indicated that PT. Oti Eya Abadi, PT. Utami Rahmat and 11 other companies carry out mining activities illegally but do not receive attention from the local government.⁸⁹ Mining activities of PT. Oti Eya Abadi were also reported in *Tempo* magazine's investigation.⁹⁰ Ahmad Ali, however, clarified that he is no longer the owner of PT. Oti Eya Abadi and PT. Graha Mining Utama.⁹¹

87 Interview party chairman staff, Jakarta, January 1, 2021.

88 Seetao News, "Gezhouba Signed Contract with Indonesia Nickel Mining Project--Seetao," 2020, <https://www.seetao.com/details/35620.html>.

89 Medianasional.id, "Pemda Morowali Terkesan Tutup Mata Atas Indikasi Tambang Ilegal PT. Oti Eya Abadi Dan PT. Utami Rachmat Membangun | Medianasional.Id," 2021, <https://www.medianasional.id/pemda-morowali-terkesan-tutup-mata-atas-indikasi-tambang-ilegal-pt-oti-eya-abadi-dan-pt-utami-rachmat-membangun/>.

90 Nur Haryanto, "Hutan Habis Nikel Binas," *Tempo*, January 30, 2022, <https://newsletter.tempo.co/read/1555516/hutan-habis-nikel-binas>.

91 *Tempo*, "Klarifikasi Ahmad Ali Soal Deforestasi Nikel Sulawesi - Surat - Majalah.Tempo.Co," accessed February 20, 2022, <https://majalah.tempo.co/read/surat/165199/klarifikasi-ahmad-ali-soal-deforestasi-nikel-sulawesi>.

Ahmad Ali is also known to have substantial social capital. The *Insan Cita* Foundation, chaired by his wife, often sends local residents on the *Umrah* and *Hajj* pilgrimage. The Foundation also assists in the renovation of mosques and distributes *qurban* meat to various religious groups in Central Sulawesi during *Eid Al-Adha*.⁹² Ahmad Ali's social capital is quoted in the following interview:

Ahmad Ali has solid social capital; he is a wealthy man. He helps *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) and helps people to go for *Umrah* (pilgrimage). He also actively gives donations. For example, during *Eid Al-Adha*, he donated up to 20 cows in *Alkhairat*. He sent the poor to go on *Umrah*. So that's the advantage of having money; the sustenance is also enormous.⁹³

Additionally, through the *Insan Cita* Foundation, prayer activities are often held, attended by many. The frequency of this activity increased before the general elections.⁹⁴ This social capital benefits Rusdy-Ma'mun who were campaigned by Ahmad Ali, during which residents flocked to attend the campaign events to express their gratitude.

In the Hidayat-Bartho camp, the businessman involved in helping with the financing was Firman Lapide. He was also the Chairman of *Sahabat Hidayat Lamakarate* (the campaign team of Hidayat Lamakarate).

I know him, and he (Firman Lapide) also played a role. In fact, he was not only helping physically, but he also made financial contributions to the campaign. The Firman that I know is a loyal and royal person. This means that whoever the cadres are who are supported by his party, he will be loyal, royal, and not a half-hearted person.⁹⁵

Among activists and politicians in Palu (the capital of Central Sulawesi) and Central Sulawesi, Firman Lapide is a person who has particularly close ties to the then Central Sulawesi Governor Longki Djanggola. Firman is also the Chairman of the Central Sulawesi Provincial Branch of the Gerindra Party and the Chairman of the Advisory Team of the Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala success team. Apart from being a party official, he also heads up several companies operating in the mining, forestry, plantation and industrial sectors. One of the companies that he heads is PT. Hong Thai, which operates in the pine resin industry. PT. Hong Thai is one of four Chinese companies, subsidiaries of China First Heavy Industries (CFHI) Co. Ltd. CHFI

92 Kabar Selebes ID, "Yayasan Insan Cita Indonesia Berangkatkan Umrah Warga Sulteng | KabarSelebes.Id," January 23, 2018, <https://www.kabarselebes.id/berita/2018/01/23/yayasan-insan-cita-indonesia-berangkatkan-umrah-warga-sulteng/>.

93 Interview Local Journalist, Palu, January 8, 2021.

94 Metro Sulawesi Id, "Ribuan Warga Doa Dan Dzikir Bersama Yayasan ICI | Metrosulawesi," February 4, 2019,

95 Interview with PDIP politician, Palu, January 14, 2021.

is a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise that invested in the Palu Special Economic Zone (SEZ). PT. Hong Thai invested Rp. 13.7 billion (USD 955,000). At the end of 2019, the Governor of Central Sulawesi Longki Djanggola attended the contract signing event that marked CFHI's investment in the Palu SEZ.

Other politicians and entrepreneurs who share party affiliations with the Hidayat-Bartho pair are Ambo Dalle and Andi Bangsawan Lamakarate. Ambo Dalle is a member of the Central Sulawesi Provincial DPRD from the Gerindra Party and the Deputy Chairperson of the Gerindra Party Provincial Board. Meanwhile, Andi Bangsawan Lamakarate is the Deputy Chair of the Gerindra Party Provincial Board. Andi Bangsawan Lamakarate is also a cousin of Hidayat Lamakarate. Ambo Dalle and Andi Bangsawan Lamakarate are also active in the mining sector. They own shares in PT. Mitra Karya Agung, a nickel mining company with a mining permit in Morowali Regency since 2016 that will expire in 2031. The largest share of PT. Mitra Karya Agung is owned by PT. Bukaka Mandiri Sejahtera, a subsidiary of the Kalla Group. The majority share ownership is in the hands of Achmad Kalla, who is also the President Commissioner of PT. Bukaka Mandiri Sejahtera.⁹⁶ Kalla Group is a business conglomerate once led by the former Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, Jusuf Kalla.

The Hidayat-Bartho pair also received support from the incumbent Governor of Central Sulawesi, Longki Djanggola. As governor, Longki could open access to campaign financing. Commenting on the involvement of entrepreneurs in the campaign of Hidayat Lamakarate-Bartholomeus Tandigala, a local Gerindra politician said:

Financing for large regional elections starts from witness funds, costumes, campaign equipment (tents, sound systems, food), campaign mobilisation, vehicle rental, giving calendars, masks, hand sanitiser, merchandise, credits, to team financing. So we really need a big budget. There are various sources of funding, some from cadres, especially party members in each region. Then there are also entrepreneurs and individuals, and according to PKPU rules, it is possible, and it is reported as campaign funds.⁹⁷

During the tenure of Governor Longki Djanggola, the issuance of business permits for natural resource extraction grew rapidly. This often resulted in policies that favoured investment and ignored the environmental impacts. For example, through a proposed revision of the spatial plan in 2020, the Central Sulawesi provincial government, under Governor Longki, changed the designation and function of forest areas for investment purposes (see Table 5). This alteration favours mining companies and oil palm plantations, especially for the three companies that environmental activists have widely criticised. Allegedly, Murad Husain, the owner of PT. Kurnia Luwuk Se-

96 Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, "MODI," 2021, <https://modi.esdm.go.id/portal/detailPerusahaan/8803>.

97 Interview with Gerindra politician, Palu, February 15, 2021.

jati was one of the entrepreneurs who paid for Longki Djanggola and Sudarto's campaign costs in the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Central Sulawesi.⁹⁸

Table 5. The Alteration of the Use and Function of Forest Areas in the 2020 Central Sulawesi Spatial Planning

Company Name	Land Area	Recommendation	Argument	Information
PT. Kurnia Luwuk Sejati (palm oil plantation)	1,771 Ha	Conversion of Production Forest and Limited Production Forest Into Other Use Areas	Accommodating regional interests for investment	PT. Kurnia Luwuk Sejati's activities caused agrarian conflicts with residents in Banggai Regency
PT. Swarna Pratama (nickel mining)	1,945 Ha	Change of Protected Forest into Limited Production Forest	Raw material support for industrial estates (North Morowali)	In 2020, PT. Swarna Pratama sparked community protest over alleged pollution in North Morowali Regency
PT. Palu Mineral Image (Gold mining)	1,126 Ha	Change of Natural Reserve Area to Limited Production Forest	Raw materials for industrial estates	The activities of PT Citra Palu Mineral overlap with the natural reserve area (KSA)

SOURCE: INTEGRATED TEAM FOR CHANGES IN FOREST AREA FUNCTIONAL USE OF CENTRAL SULAWESI (2021)

Based on the description above, we find two important findings. First, in the Central Sulawesi gubernatorial elections, business interests were, directly and indirectly, involved in providing support—especially financial backing—to both candidates. Those who were directly involved publicly declared themselves as supporters of one of the candidates. This public declaration may take the form, for example, of inclusion of their names as members of the campaign teams. The entrepreneurs use their names, or their companies, to provide political and financial support, including campaign donations, covering the costs for witnesses at polling stations, and buying parties' seats during the nomination phase. The entrepreneurs also played a role in issuing recommendations to political parties, mobilising mass campaigns, hiring political consultants, controlling public opinion through their social media and mass media, distributing social assistance, and designing coalitions supporting political parties. Generally, entrepreneurs who are directly involved also hold a political position, either at the national or local levels.

Second, the involvement of the entrepreneurs was animated by two motives, namely the interest to promote their political parties and to maintain their wealth and business continuation. The entrepreneurs usually hold a strategic position in their political parties. They are eager to help the candidates to win the executive elections to dominate and control local politics. Additionally, they also want to maintain the

98 STAI Interview with Academics, Palu, February 11, 2021.

continuity of their businesses. Therefore, for some entrepreneurs, it is not surprising if they donate to all candidates because it is a part of the strategy to maintain their wealth.

5. Conclusion

The presence of oligarchs in politics is a phenomenon that can be observed in every democratic country, including both established and emerging democracies. An established democracy like the United States, for example, cannot escape from the influence of oligarchy. Wealthy entrepreneurs can influence the lobbying process, elections, opinion formation, and even the constitution of the United States.⁹⁹ Post-communist Russia and Ukraine also face a similar problem, wherein oligarchic forces strongly influence the country's economic and political system.¹⁰⁰ The oligarchs' influence in Ukraine, for example, has left the legislative and executive institutions ineffectual in carrying out their functions. The oligarchy in Ukraine is spreading, but the oligarchs who fund political parties and own the media are more adaptable, influential, and richer than those who rely solely on assets.¹⁰¹ This may be why oligarchs who own several businesses and media are also interested in entering politics through funding and establishing political parties, as happened in Indonesia.

Central Sulawesi—an Indonesian province with abundant natural resources—has become a locus of contention for entrepreneurs to obtain mining and plantation permits, thus encouraging them to become involved in provincial elections, directly or indirectly. The involvement of entrepreneurs in funding elections campaigns has become a common phenomenon in subnational elections in Indonesia. Central Sulawesi adds to the long list of *Pilkada* involving entrepreneurs, although it is unique compared to entrepreneurs' involvement in other regions. In Central Sulawesi, entrepreneurs establish business relations with foreign investments engaged in the emerging mining sector, namely nickel. The entrepreneurs usually also hold a strategic position in political parties, making them financially and politically powerful. Those entrepreneurs use the mining sector as a resource base for their economic power and political parties as a source of political power. They can use their money to fund the campaign, and they can use their power as party administrators to support the nomination of a candidate who aspires to run in local elections.

Acknowledgements

The researcher would like to thank the mining community network (JATAM), the Forum

99 Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, "Oligarchy in the United States?," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 4 (December 2009): 731-51, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709991770>.

100 Anders Aslund, "Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2005), <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441910>.

101 Markus and Charnysh, "The Flexible Few."

for the Environment (WALHI), the General Election Commission (KPU) of Central Sulawesi for providing rich information, as well as political party administrators for their time given for the interviews. Also, thanks to the International Publications & Collaboration Center, Tadulako University, for providing support to publish this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest as reported by the author(s)

Funding

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List of Interviews

- Interview Academics, STA 2, February 15, 2021.
- Interview Academics, STA1, February 11, 2021.
- Interview Coordinator Regional Survey, STL 1, February 7, 2021.
- Interview Local Journalist, STM1, January 8, 2021.
- Interview NGO, STN1, January 19, 2021.
- Interview NGO, STN4, February 16, 2021.
- Interview party chairman staff, STS 2, February 11, 2021.
- Interview Politician Gerindra, STP 3, February 15, 2021.
- Interview Politician Nasdem, STP 4, February 15, 2021.
- Interview Politician PDIP, STP 1, January 14, 2021.
- Interview Politician PKB, STP 2, January 15, 2021.
- Interview Research Institute Survey, STL 2, February 3, 2021.

Book Review

Democracy In Indonesia: From Stagnation To Regression?

Edited By Thomas Power And Eve Warburton.

Singapore: Iseas Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020.

Softcover: 371pp.

Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? raises questions on the meanings and consequences of the decline of democratic institutions in Indonesia. The book provides a range of cases and analyses that build well-sounded arguments at the macro, meso, and micro levels. With its focus on Indonesia, this book contributes to the debates around a global trend of democratic decline and populist approaches to governmentality.

This book is divided into five chapters based on its umbrella topics, including, first, historical and comparative perspectives that highlight the democratic status (i.e. through the liberal democracy index) of Indonesia amongst Southeast Asian countries and globally (Allen Hicken), as well as temporal comparative study in explaining the relative success of Indonesia's democratic transition in 1998 (Dan Slater). The second chapter discusses polarization and populism. Eve Warburton argues that the rise of populism in Indonesia indicates latent ideological divisions that have turned into political conflicts, followed by Nava Nuraniyah highlighting the roles of Indonesian Islamist and pluralist fractions in contributing to a downwards-spiralling to authoritarian pluralism. Liam Gammon adds the element of electoral rules and institutional frameworks' roles in reducing the force of populism in Indonesia, which he also argues might be weakening Indonesian democracy from the grassroots upwards (i.e. the emergence of populist grassroots movements). Lastly, rather different from other authors who emphasize identities and ideological differences, Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir argues that the rise of populism is a symptom of undemocratic institutions in redistributing resources. Mudhoffir views that widening socioeconomic inequality has contributed to the more polarized society in Indonesia.

The third chapter discusses societal-level popular support for democracy, which highlights acceptance of election results by electoral losers as an indicator of democratic deconsolidation (Burhanuddin Muhtadi), and people's conception of multidimensional democracy in the Indonesian context (Diego Fosatti and Ferran Martinez i Coma). The fourth chapter discusses Indonesia's democratic institutions by examining the roles of political parties as vehicles of the peoples' aspirations, the mass media, redistribution policies among regions, as well as state surveillance regulation and practices. Marcus Mietzner observes the rise of electoral personalization, or the reliance on personal charisma, networks, financial resources, and capabilities, to mobilize voters has weakened political parties' roles in a democratic setting. Ross Tapsell highlights the concentration of power,

which relates to the political economy of media ownership, and how partisanship of the media has weakened the media's ability to provide checks and balances in a tripartite democratic system. A study by Puspa Delima Amri and Mochamad Pasha shows that there is no definitive relationship between the level of the democracy index and income inequality within and across the regions. Ken M.P. Setiawan highlights the trend of increasing state surveillance on citizens and civil society through the enactment of the Information and Electronic Transaction Law.

The last chapter emphasizes the phenomenon of how policing of law enforcement, policing of religious offences, identity and electoral violence have been observed in the Indonesian political landscape. Thomas P. Power argues that power highly concentrated in the executive branch of tripartite democracy, 'the executive aggrandizement', has been observed and has enabled politicization of law enforcement. Sana Jaffrey proposes three stages of vigilantism against religious offences as part of broader suppression of civil society dissent and opposition. Irsyad Rafsadie, Dyah Ayu Kartika, and Siswo Mulyartono provide a case in point on how identity politics, based on ethnicity and local-migrant status, and misinformation resulted in horizontal conflicts and co-optation in exerting control over election outcomes in West Kalimantan. Risa J. Toha and S.P. Harish close the book by reflecting on the dynamics and forms of violence incidents associated with direct elections since the country's *Reformasi* in 1998/9.

Democracy as a means or ends?

This book feeds into the policy debates around democracy's positionality for human welfare. There has been an ongoing debate on the role of 'basic structures', borrowing Rawls term (1971), or as Sen addressed it, 'democratic institutions' (2009), in delivering good outcomes for society. Fraser (2008) stressed that meta-political representation justice is critical to enable a democratic process in defining and realizing or, in other words, contesting, justice and its meanings. As Stiglitz put it 'good politics brings good policy'. This conversation raises the question of whether democracy should be treated *eo ipso* or as a means to increase human welfare (Rawls 1971; Sen 2009; Stiglitz 2012).

Following recent developments in Indonesia, the overall argument of the book can help to make sense of the slow response of the government that has dragged out the pandemic and caused loss of life and economic stagnation. Executive aggrandizement and the lack of effective checks and balances on power from the legislature and the media seem to hinder pressure to deal with the pandemic. Despite several critical media and civil society movements to urge the government to focus on people before the economy in dealing with Covid-19, the responses are rather slow and remain ineffective. In many places, prerequisite conditions have hampered individuals, households, and communities in dealing with the pandemic without adequate government support. For instance, there remain hundreds of thousands of households without access to clean water, especially in Eastern and remote areas in Indonesia. The informality of work has put workers in a more vulnerable

situation, facing termination without adequate compensation. This is when social protection becomes vital to provide essentials, such as food and cash, to enable households and communities to float amidst the pandemic. Finally, borrowing Pippa Norris' (2011) question, and refocussing the debate about democracy and democratic institutions as processes to enable democratic decision-making: to what extent, without the presence of *liberal democracy*, will the people be suffering?

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Book Review

Secrets And Power In Myanmar: Intelligence And The Fall Of General Khin Nyunt

By Andrew Selth.

Singapore: Iseas Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019.

Softcover: 248pp.

Military intelligence under military rule has often played a significant role in preserving that regime's longevity, notably undermining opposition movements. Moreover, a military that focuses on internal security tends to strengthen its military intelligence for domestic security affairs, allowing the intelligence unit to exert a significant influence. This is the case with the Myanmar military or *Tatmadaw*. However, the *Tatmadaw* is notorious for its secrecy as the primary operational norm, rather than its intelligence. Andrew Selth, a seasoned Myanmar military and security expert, attempts to shed some light on Myanmar's intelligence world through *Secrets and Power in Myanmar: Intelligence and the Fall of General Khin Nyunt*. Selth does not focus solely on the modus operandi of the intelligence system in Myanmar but also the role of General Khin Nyunt, the former Chief of Military Intelligence (MIS) at the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) (1983-2004) and the country's former Prime Minister (2003-2004).

In this book, Selth aims to explain the complex world of Myanmar intelligence. Such an attempt sheds some light on the role of intelligence under a military regime. Selth's research shows that military intelligence and the military, in general, do not always walk side by side. In fact, the DDSI represents a different political bloc to the military within the *Tatmadaw*. Furthermore, Selth voices his agreement with David Steinberg's argument that 'there is no tradition in Myanmar of sharing power' (p.65). This means that the rise of Khin Nyunt created a power struggle within the *Tatmadaw*. Likewise, the fall of Khin Nyunt was followed by the purge of his followers. Selth also offers a number of reasons behind Khin Nyunt's banishment (pp. 61-65). One of the reasons was Khin Nyunt's apparent manoeuvre to forge a closer relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi's camp. Nonetheless, it is hard to tell if Khin Nyunt genuinely supported democratization in Myanmar.

Selth's book provides us with valuable insights on the rise and fall of Khin Nyunt, as well as the dynamics of Myanmar's notorious intelligence unit, DDSI. However, the book does not offer a theoretical perspective on the study of authoritarianism or Myanmar's democratization. Some discussion in the book gives a glimpse of how the *Tatmadaw* generals preserve unity and cohesion of the military to keep themselves in power (pp. 57-59). Despite such useful information, *Secrets and Power in Myanmar* has little use in explaining the 2021 coup, which is beyond the book's scope. Moreover, Selth's attempt to cover a wide range

of topics related to Myanmar intelligence, such as the dynamics between DDSI and other military factions, the fall of Khin Nyunt, intelligence operational issues, post-Khin Nyunt development, and even foreign relations, results in a lack of in-depth analysis.

Overall, this book will be helpful for Myanmar watchers and students of Myanmar. The book provides information and insights on important dynamics within the Tatmadaw. The attempt to uncover the hidden world of Myanmar intelligence compensates for the book's lack of theoretical contribution. Such limited theoretical contribution means that *Secrets and Power in Myanmar* has little use in helping us to understand the phenomenon of intelligence under military regimes elsewhere. Despite this, the book will be a valuable addition to area studies, particularly Myanmar studies, and readers who are interested in understanding security issues in the country. In addition, this book can be positioned as one step towards a better understanding of Myanmar's intelligence world and trigger further study on the subject.

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THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF
ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

VOLUME 01 NUMBER 2, JULY – DECEMBER 2021